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IV

Nature of the Case
Woodrow John Grant appeals

the summary dismissal of his petition

for post-conviction relief.

The underlying facts of Grant's case have been previously outlined by the
Idaho Supreme Court:
In 2006, Woodrow John Grant pleaded guilty to aggravated
battery; he successfully completed a period of retained jurisdiction
and was placed on probation. In 2009, Grant was charged with
possession of methamphetamine, domestic battery, aggravated
assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Grant's appointed
counsel moved to withdraw, stating that Grant had reneged on an
agreed-upon plea bargain and that communications between then
had broken down. The district court denied the motion. Later,
Grant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and
domestic battery, and admitted to violating the terms of his
probation. The district court considered a letter and live testimony
from the victim of Grant's domestic battery, in which the victim
expressed her opinions on Grant's crime, character, and the
sentence that would be proper for him. Thereafter, the district court
sentenced Grant to five years fixed and five years indeterminate for
domestic battery, to be served concurrently with a sentence of two
years fixed and three years indeterminate for possession of
methamphetamine.
The district court also revoked Grant's
probation and executed his preciously suspended sentence of four
years fixed and six years indeterminate. The two new sentences
were to be served consecutively to the reinstated 2006 sentence.
Therefore, Grant was sentenced to a total of nine years fixed and
eleven years indeterminate - far less than the thirty-two year
maximum combined sentence for his three crimes.
Grant
requested leniency in three I C.R. 35 motions, which the district
court denied.
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State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, _ , 297 P.3d 244, 245 (2013).
judgments of conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.

kl

Grant's

at _ , 297

P.3d at 251.
Grant filed a pro se petition and affidavit for post-conviction relief asserting
twelve separate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, that there was new
evidence not previously presented, his guilty plea was induced, his guilty plea
was involuntary because of mental incompetence, and his sentence was
excessive. (R., pp.1-8.) Grant also filed a motion and affidavit in support for the
appointment of post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.9-12.) The district court filed a
notice of intent to dismiss Grant's petition for post-conviction relief, wherein it
denied Grant's motion for the appointment of counsel because it found his claims
were frivolous and failed to allege facts raising the possibility of a valid claim.
(R., pp.23-49.) Grant filed a response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss,
making the same arguments he asserted in his petition, with additional factual
assertions, but failing to support his claims with any additional documents or
affidavits. (R., pp.51-60.) At the same time, Grant filed a motion to amend his
petition to include "underlying criminal records including, but not limited to, the
county jail's records during defendant's stay there, the psych-evaluation, and the
past and current medical records including mental health files." (R., p.50.) The
court thereafter entered an order dismissing Grant's petition for post-conviction
relief finding Grant's claims were without merit.
Grant timely appealed. (R., pp.117-121.)
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(R., pp.86-107.)

ISSUES

Grant states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Whether the district court erred when it declined to appoint
counsel in Mr. Grant's post-conviction action, even though he had
made the necessary showing to merit appointment of counsel.
2.
Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed
Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief without properly
considering the undisputed factual allegations he made in his
verified petition and affidavit in support of that petition.
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)

The state rephrases the issue as follows:
Has Grant failed to show error in the district court's denial of post-conviction
counsel?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Grant Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Request For The Appointment Of Counsel

A.

Introduction
Grant challenges the summary dismissal of his successive post-conviction

petition and the denial of his request for counsel, contending the claims in his
petition, considered either alone or in combination with his response to the
district court's notice of intent to dismiss, raised genuine issues of material fact
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing or, at a minimum, raised the possibility of a
valid claim entitling him to the appointment of post-conviction counsel.
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-27. Grant's arguments fail. Application of the law to the
facts supports the district court's determination that Grant's pleadings failed to
establish even the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim. Grant has therefore
failed to show error in either the denial of his request for counselor the dismissal
of his petition for post-conviction relief.1

1 A post-conviction claim is properly dismissed if the petitioner fails to present
evidence sufficient to show a material issue of fact on which relief can be
granted. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522-23, 164 P.3d 798, 802-03
(2007). Because this is a higher burden than demonstrating the possibility of a
valid claim necessitating the appointment of counsel, Judd v. State, 148 Idaho
22,24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009), Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 345, 223
P.3d 281, 287 (2009), the remainder of this section of the Respondent's brief will
focus on the "possibility of a valid claim" standard on the assumption that if Grant
did not show entitlement to counsel the dismissal of his claims is proper, but that
if he did show entitlement to counsel then dismissal without the opportunity of
counsel to appear was error.
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Standard Of Review
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or

a request for

appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v.
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho
682, 683, 214

3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009).

The court's discretion is not

unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
654,152 P.3d 12,15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793,102 P.3d at 1112
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 684, 214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct.
App.2009).
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be
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expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001) (quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792,
102 P. 3d at 1111).

C.

Grant Has Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To The Appointment
Of Post-Conviction Counsel
Grant asserts on appeal that the district court erred by denying his motion

for appointment of counsel because he "made the necessary showing to require
appointment of counsel as he alleged facts supporting some of the elements of
his claims for relief." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Grant also argues the court violated
his constitutional right to due process by failing to appoint post-conviction
counsel because "the post-conviction action was [his] first opportunity to present
these issues, particularly his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) Grant's arguments are unfounded.

1.

Grant Does Not Have A Constitutional Right To The Appointment
Of Counsel In A Post-Conviction Proceeding

Idaho law does not grant a post-conviction petitioner an absolute right to
counsel.

Rather, counsel may be denied for frivolous claims.

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13.

I.C. § 19-4904;

Grant asserts on

appeal that the district court erred by applying Idaho law in denying the
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appointment of post-conviction counsel because he had a due process right to be
represented by counsel "since the post-conviction action was Mr. Grant's first
opportunity to present these issues, particularly his claims of ineffective
assistance of counseL"

(Appellant's brief, p.6.)

Although he concedes "[t]he

question of whether there is such a due process right has yet to be decided by
the United States Supreme Court," Grant urges this Court to find !Idaho law
regarding the appointment of counsel unconstitutional because he has an
absolute constitutional right to post-conviction counsel.
Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.)

(See generally,

Grant relies on the United States Supreme Court

case Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), for his contention that there
should be a due process right to counsel in state post-conviction cases although
he recognizes the Court "did not completely resolve that question."

(See

generally, Appellant's brief, pp.7-13.) Grant's reliance on Martinez is misplaced
and his request for remand on this basis should be rejected.
At issue in Martinez was "whether a federal habeas court may excuse a
procedural default of an ineffective-assistance of counsel claim when the claim
was not properly presented in state court due to an attorney's errors in an initialreview collateral proceeding."

132 S.Ct. at 1313.

In resolving this issue, the

Court held, "Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural
default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of
ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there
was no counselor counsel in that proceeding was ineffective." Martinez, 132
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S.Ct at 1320. Martinez clearly has no relevance here not only because this is
not a federal habeas proceeding, but also because Martinez has no application in
Idaho since, unlike the Arizona law at issue in Martinez, Idaho does not
categorically bar defendants from raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims
on direct appeal, see Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834, 203 P.3d 1221, 1233
(2009).
Grant has failed to establish the district court erred by applying Idaho law
to his request for post-conviction counsel.

2.

The District Court Correctly Denied Grant's Request For Counsel
Under Idaho Law

Grant next asserts that even if this Court declines to find an absolute
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, the district court still erred in
denying his request for the appointment of counsel under Idaho law because he
"demonstrated the potential of a valid post-conviction claim." (Appellant's brief,
p.13.) Grant has failed to show any basis for the reversal of the order denying
his request for counsel because, as the district court correctly concluded, the
allegations in Grant's petition for post-conviction failed to raise even the
possibility of a valid claim.
In analyzing Grant's request for the appointment of post-conviction
counsel, the court cited the correct legal standard (see R., pp.24-27) before
concluding Grant's allegations were frivolous and Grant failed to allege facts
raising the possibility of a valid claim (R., p.27).

the

The court specifically stated:

Based on the following findings, the Court hereby DENIES
Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of counsel, as the
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allegations made by the Petitioner are frivolous for the reasons
stated herein. Furthermore, this Court finds the Petitioner did not
allege facts raising even the possibility of a valid claim. Therefore,
the appointment of counsel is not required.
(R., p.27 (capitalization original).) Grant has failed to show he presented a viable

claim of post-conviction relief, and has therefore failed to show error in the denial
of his request for counsel.
3.

Grant Has Failed To Establish A Prima Facie Case That His
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Advise Him Of His Right To
Remain Silent During The Psychosexual Evaluation

In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel,

a

post-conviction

petitioner

must

demonstrate

both

deficient

performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness,

and there is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different.

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177

(1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
A post-conviction petitioner may demonstrate that his counsel was
ineffective where counsel failed to inform him of his right to silence in relation to a
psychosexual evaluation prepared for sentencing and the petitioner was
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prejudiced. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564-565, 149 P.3d 833, 839-840
(2006). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not
make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Roman v.

State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). If the claims in
the petition are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they
could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel and
further investigation, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed
with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions.
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798,809 (2007); Hust v. State,
147 Idaho 682,684,214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. App. 2009).
Grant asserts his counsel failed to "advise, attend, or protect [his] interests
during the psych-evaluation." (R., p.3.)

Further, Grant claims he "alleged facts

[in his petition for post-conviction relief] which demonstrated a possibly valid
claim that his attorney's performance was deficient" in failing to "advise him about
his Estrada rights in regard to the psychological evaluation conducted as a part
of the presentence investigation." (Appellant's brief, p.15 (citation omitted).) The
facts alleged by Grant in his petition were simply that he was not made aware
that he "was not obligated to provide information that would be used against
him." (R., p.3.)

The allegation that he was not advised of his rights, without

more, does not show deficient performance or resulting prejudice.

Although

Grant asserted in his response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss his
petition for post-conviction relief that he was never informed that he was not
required to participate in the psychological evaluation (R., p.54), Grant
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"presented no admissible evidence to demonstrate his counsel failed to
him properly regarding his rights prior to his participation in the psychological
examination."

(R.,p. 98.) Additionally, the district court found upon review

Grant's guilty plea questionnaire that Grant understood his right to remain
his right to refuse to provide incriminating information, and that his attorney "had
advised him that he had 'a constitutional right not to submit to a court ordered
psychosexual evaluation for purposes of sentencing.'" (R., p.98.)
Finally, Grant does not even claim that being fully informed would have
changed his choices in relation to his participation in the evaluation. The district
court did not err in concluding that Grant's claims were disproved by the record
and conclusory and therefore Grant failed to set forth the possibility of a valid
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the issue of failing to advise
of his rights as they related to his submission to the psychological examination.

4.

Grant Has Not Shown The District Court Erred In Dismissing
His Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To
Protect Grant's Interests As Relating To His PSI

Grant asserted in his petition for post-conviction relief that his counsel
failed to "advise, attend, or protect [his] interests during the Pre-Sentence
Investigation." (R., p.3.)

Grant claims he was deprived of the opportunity to

challenge, explain, or rebut the information in his PSI because his "attorney had
failed to review the PSI with him or to assist him in challenging erroneouslyincluded or otherwise unreliable information contained therein."

(Appellant's

brief, p.21.) Grant takes the position on appeal that such failure was objectively
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unreasonable and the allegation of such demonstrates the prejudice of counsel's
performance. (Id.)
Nowhere in Grant's petition for post-conviction relief, accompanying
affidavit, or response to the court's notice does he assert what erroneous
information was contained within his PSI or used against him at sentencing.
Grant's unsupported statement that counsel deprived him of the right to
challenge erroneous information alone is insufficient to establish deficient
performance or resulting prejudice.

Because this claim is frivolous, the district

court did not err by denying counsel.

5.

Grant Has Not Made a Prima Facie Case For The Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failure To Provide Mitigating
Evidence At Sentencing

In his petition for post-conviction relief, Grant alleged his counsel "failed to
provide the sentencing court with mitigating evidence and evidence conflicting
the victim's allegations despite such evidence being available[.]' (R., p.3.)

In his

accompanying affidavit, Grant asserted his victim had a "history of self-abuse"
and had "threatened to blame [him] for injuries that were self-inflicted." (R., p.5.)
Further, Grant stated the victim had "behavioral problems" and "brushes with the
law" that had been "covered up." (ld.) Grant support these blanket statements
with no admissible evidence. Grant claims he identified the evidence he believed
trial counsel failed to offer in mitigation at his sentencing in his response to the
district court's notice of intent to dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief:
Specifically, he alleged that there were two witnesses, one of
whom would have contradicted the victim's version of events and
who would have testified as to the overall inadequacies of the
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investigation, and another who would have testified that the police
had "'lost' testimony" or other evidence that should have been
presented to the district court.
(Appellant's brief, p.22 (citation omitted).)

In his response to the district court's

notice of intent to dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief, Grant also
included his attorney's failure to provide "mental health record from public and
private institutions" as evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel for not
providing adequate mitigation information

the sentencing court. (R., p.S5.)

To prevail on his claims that trial counsel was ineffective, a petitioner is
required to present facts, supported by admissible evidence, to "overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be
considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984). An ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to present
evidence cannot satisfy the deficient performance or resulting prejudice prongs
without providing the substance of the potential testimony or other admissible
evidence of facts counsel should have discovered and presented.

Knutsen v.

144 Idaho 433,443, 163 P.3d 222, 232 (Ct. App. 2007). To show deficient
performance, a defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that counsel's
performance was adequate by demonstrating that counsel's representation did
not meet objective standards of competence." Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 124,
952 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). Indeed, it is
well established that appellate courts "will not second guess counsel without
evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation."
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State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho

466, 469-470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Larkin,
102 Idaho 231, 234, 628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981); State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho
425,426, 546 P.2d 380, 381 (1976)).
Here, Grant is asking this Court to second-guess his trial counsel's
strategy at sentencing on the basis of lack of evidence. However, he has failed
to meet his affirmative duty to show, through the presentation of evidence, that
his trial counsel's alleged decision to not present certain witnesses or the results
of mental health evaluations for sentencing was because of inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, of any other objective shortcoming.
That Grant currently believes that the better approach at sentencing would have
been to argue that his victim's version of events was not true does not establish a
non-frivolous claim of objective deficiency of trial counsel at sentencing.
Additionally, Grant failed to assert any prejudice, only claiming on appeal
that it is "strongly implied" in his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that
"had the district court been presented with this evidence, Mr. Grant would have
received a more lenient sentence." (R., p.22 (citation omitted).) Grant has failed
to establish a potentially viable claim of deficient performance or resulting
prejudice through his unsupported statements that trial counsel should have
provided mitigating evidence at sentencing.

6.

Grant Has Not Established The Possibility Of A Valid Claim That
His Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing to Move For A Change Of
Venue Or To Disqualify The Presiding Judge

In his petition for post-conviction relief, Grant made the unsupported
allegation that his trial counsel failed to move for a change of venue "even when
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counsel was informed that the victim's mother was a secretary of the local
chief." (R., p.2.) Additionally, Grant asserted the sitting trial judge should have
been disqualified because of a potential bias.

(ld.)

These claims were not

supported by any admissible evidence, only more unsupported factual claims, in
Grant's response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss his petition for
post-conviction relief. (See R., p.52.)
Additionally, Grant has failed to even allege any prejudice. He does not
allege any basis upon which a motion for a change of venue or to disqualify the
trial judge would have been granted. Grant is not entitled to a presumption of
prejudice as he seems to assert on appeal. (See, Appellant's brief, p.25 ("Those
allegations also imply the argument that the decision not to challenge venue
cause prejudice to Mr. Grant through the loss of due process and a neutral
magistrate.").)
Grant failed to raise a potentially viable claim that a motion for change of
venue or disqualification of the trial judge would have been granted.

Because

Grant failed to raise a non-frivolous claim that counsel was ineffective for failing
to file a motion for change of venue or to disqualify the judge, the district court
properly dismissed his claim without a hearing.

7.

Grant Failed To Establish A Potentially Viable Claim That His Guilty
Plea Was Not Knowingly And Voluntarily Entered

"Before a trial court accepts a plea of guilty in a felony case, the record
must show that the plea has been made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily,
and the validity of a plea is to be determined by considering all the relevant
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circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record."

State v.

Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 833, 839 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting
State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,297-98,787 P.2d 281, 283-84 (1990) (citation
omitted).
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Grant asserted his guilty plea "was
not knowingly/voluntarily entered as it was induced by promises not kept" as well
as because Grant was "mentally incompetent due to being bi-polar." (R., p.2.)
Grant claimed, without the support of admissible evidence, that his trial counsel
"made false assurances of what the plea bargain would accomplish and what
kind of sentence [he] could expect." (R., pA.) Grant also claimed his attorney
"should have been cognizant of [his] bi-polar mood swings and recognized
depression driven behaviors such as giving up and not appealing the sentence
and conviction."

(Id.) This claim is unsupported by any admissible evidence.

Review of the record, which establishes that Grant entered the plea to avoid a
possible conviction on greater charges and significantly longer incarceration,
shows this claim to be without merit.
Grant was originally charged with possession of methamphetamine,
domestic battery, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm as
well as facing a probation violation for an earlier conviction. He ultimately pled
guilty to possession of a controlled substance and domestic battery, and
admitted to violating the terms of his probation. "Grant was sentenced to a total
of nine years fixed and eleven years indeterminate - far less than the thirty-two
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maximum combined sentence for his three crimes."
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154 Idaho at

, 297 P.3d at 251.
Additionally, Grant claims he was unable to enter a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent plea because of his "mental health issues." (R., pp.26-27.)

Grant

did not support his claim that he involuntarily pled guilty because of mental health
Although he moved for the admission of "past and current medical
including mental health files," such motion was made subsequent to the
20 days provided in the notice of intent to dismiss his petition for post-conviction
relief and only requested the court review such materials although no such
documents were provided to the court. (R., p.50) Grant offered nothing more
than his own conclusory statements and personal opinions as to his mental
deficiencies and therefore failed to provide any admissible evidence that he was
incompetent at the time he entered

guilty plea. These bare assertions alone

are insufficient to make a potentially viable case in light of the existing record.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Grant's petition for post-convicti
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